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Warfare at Sea, 1500–1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe 
By Jan Glete. London: Routledge, 2000. ISBN: 978-0415214551. 
 
 In his work Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of 
Europe, Jan Glete makes a convincing case for the role that naval strength plays in the greater 
European balance of power. Glete successfully supports the notion that control of the seas is 
essential to ensuring economic prosperity and military dominance. The changes of sea power in 
history led to the gradual shift of political and economic focus from Southern Europe and the 
Mediterranean to Northern Europe.  
 Glete organizes the book into two parts, the first handling theoretical discussion of the 
role of naval warfare and the second examining case studies. This division is frequently violated 
but exclusively to the benefit of the reader. This book is intended for an audience of primarily 
academics or interested naval enthusiasts, eschewing popular stories for scholarly citations. In 
fact it is this reliance on citations in the earlier part of the book that may leave the piece 
inaccessible as a piece of popular history.  
 Glete works towards two different ends which assist in fostering a greater understanding 
of the role of warfare at sea. He explains both the theoretical approaches to naval warfare and the 
developments in technology that made them possible. No better application of this convergence 
exists than the example of the military revolution. Glete obsesses over the literature surrounding 
the Military Revolution, a rapid development in military technology and organization that 
occurred following the France’s invasion of Italy in the 16th century. Glete lists several historians 
on the military revolution, including Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker, and Jeremy Black, but 
notes that they stand united in silence on the role that naval power had in the military revolution 
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(9). For Glete, the military revolution that those authors spoke of ignored the very dynamic 
nature of sea power. It was Jeremy Black, among others that noted the correlation between the 
rise of state power and the simultaneous rise in military power controlled by the state (10). It is 
this idea that Glete later ties his notions of dynamic sea power to.  
 What separates Glete from the rest of the literature is his work on the interdependent 
interactions of the rise of states, the rise of navies, and the rise of commerce. The author notes 
that prior to his efforts, the military revolution literature had noted some interplay between 
commerce and the military-state apparatus, mostly pioneered by Frederick C. Lane (12). In his 
model, states sell protection as a product, the more efficiently they sell this product the more they 
are able to expand and dominate. This relationship was due in part to the cost of protecting trade 
and the benefits of plunder. A militarily robust state could both successfully prevent other states 
from ransacking their trade and engage in beneficial plunder. Thankfully, the author critiques 
many of the unfortunate assumptions of Lane. The most important one being the lack of an open 
state-market for protection. States have effective regional monopolies on protection, with only 
consumers at the periphery eligible for competition. Despite this major shortfall, Glete is able to 
take Lane’s ideas on the efficient use of violence and bring them to powerful conclusions. States 
that effectively and efficiently use force at sea will be able to dominate both the commercial and 
political spheres.  
 Glete eventually lists five major developments in the selected period as being critical for 
comprehension of naval warfare (5). The first development is the formation and integration of 
territorial states. As mentioned previously, Glete heavily focuses on the interaction between state 
formation, the military revolution, and the development of state naval capacity. The second is the 
rise and decline of political and economic empires. This stage is largely focused on during the 
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second half of the book where the author addresses some of the preeminent naval powers that 
existed during this time. The third critical development was the expansion and restructuring of 
interregional seaborne trade. This helps connect the author’s ideas for why such large state naval 
apparatuses became necessary and commonplace. The fourth development was the European 
expansion overseas. His fifth and final crucial development of the period was the technical 
transformation of warfare at sea. These developments all form the causal basis for Glete’s 
theoretical approach to the era.  
Following Glete’s identification of major developments during the period he begins his 
analysis of the existing literature on naval organization. He notes that in the past most literature 
has focused on the navy as an organization. This entails the rise of organizational forces like 
professional officer corps and their role in creating modern navies (71). Related to the 
organizational study of navies, Glete examines the command structure of navies during this era 
and points to the command shift as a source of great strength and innovation. During this time 
period, command of the navy and accompanying armies were segmented leading to potential 
conflicting interests and orders. This was replaced with a unified command that made the fleet’s 
captain the capitan de mar y guerra, in control of both seamen and soldiers (51). It was also 
during this period that the organization of navies within the state were given the credence and 
recognition befitting a modern military force. States formed on-shore bureaucracies that would 
help supply and manage the growing navies (53). This is where Glete begins to postulate that 
states that were unable to keep up with the evolution of navies would become irrelevant powers 
in the naval revolution.  
 Glete notes that while professional armies could exist outside of the state apparatus, 
typically in the form of religious orders or mercenary forces, private navies posed separate 
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challenges. Navies have costs that dwarf those of professional armies, creating large barriers for 
any potential mariners of fortune. This means that states were the only potent forces for 
enforcing a monopoly on violence at sea (68). Glete does note that states, even those of the large 
and powerful variety, did not possess a total monopoly on violence at sea. Powerful trading 
networks of private enterprise did exist, most notably the earlier Hanseatic League cities (113). 
Though these trade empires could not withstand the imperial might of rising empires, like the 
Swedes in the case of the former Hanseatic League. Glete also makes the careful distinction of 
clarifying the role of private state-controlled corporations, like the Dutch East India Company, 
which had the navy capacity of other empires but still existed as a private enterprise. These 
entities were augmentations and complements of the state and acted as such (43). They had their 
own interests outside of the state but were not fully private forces for hire like the medieval 
Swiss mercenaries. The mercenary aspect of naval power usually came in the form of 
experienced seamen or gunners, whom Glete notes were often purchased by declining and static 
naval powers to augment their depleting ranks (56). The author also makes sure to clarify the 
role of privateers and pirates during this era, as they seem to directly challenge the state naval 
monopoly model. Their use seemed to act as a sort of irregular warfare taken on by smaller 
powers engaged in asymmetric warfare. The author lists the examples of the nominally Ottoman 
corsair states of the Maghreb and the Knights of St. John (107). These were hardly threats to the 
great sea powers but served as significant nuisances. Theories on efficient naval use of violence 
and private violence undoubtedly contribute to the literature but often at the cost of simplicity. 
Glete’s handling of privateers, non-imperial navies, and private traders is messy and requires 
some acrobatic efforts of reconciliation. 
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 Glete hints at an ultimate goal of naval dominance when discussing the example of the 
Nordic states during the 1570’s and 1580’s. With Sweden as the premier Baltic power, naval 
dominance was secured and ushered in a period of peace and economic prosperity to the region 
(125). This allowed for naval development to grind to a halt and ships were now being designed 
for trade. Smaller crews were required thus allowing the cost of trade to decrease. This naval 
dominance ushered in greater prosperity. Though never explicitly stated Glete hints at this being 
one of the ultimate goals of the state in regards to naval policy.   
The author focuses strongly on the role of technology, citing the innovation of cheap cast 
iron cannons as a decisive advantage in firepower (27). Glete also helps to eliminate the false 
historical narrative that the galley era and large-cannoned sailing era lacked overlap. Glete notes 
that galleys were actually armed with cannons during the late era of galley warfare, while still 
reminding the reader that their tactics were wholly separate from those of sailing ships (28).  
 Glete’s approach to case studies remains uncontroversial. He analyses the examples of 
several regions and their power shifts through the lens of innovation. Unsurprisingly, he 
concludes that regions that held stagnant powers would soon be taken over and dominated by 
innovative powers. His prime example of naval hegemony shifts would be in the Mediterranean. 
He notes that the Ottomans and Venetians, due to their insistence on galley warfare, yielded 
control of the region to the English and Dutch (111). In Western Europe, Glete cites the 
Portuguese as the waning power unable to keep up with the pace of change. The author ends his 
case study analysis with what he calls “The First Global War at Sea”. Such an event would 
certainly serve as the prime evidence of the legitimacy of his work. In the global naval war 
between the Dutch and Hapsburgs, though truly multiple wars in short succession, his thesis 
holds and the Dutch dynamic powers reigned supreme (185).   
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 Dynamic naval powers will remain naval powers while those that refuse to adapt are 
doomed to future obscurity. The ever changing nature of warfare at sea ensures that no power 
will endure unless they continue to expend resources on their naval infrastructure. The Royal 
Navy of one era may become the Venetian Galleys of the next era. States seek to efficiently use 
violence in order to expand and maximize their naval power. Glete’s identification of this trend 
is hardly revolutionary, adaptive powers often rise while stagnant powers fall, but his application 
of these theories to the naval realm is crucial. This piece pacifies the potentially stormy state of 
naval warfare literature and provides a stable platform for future historians to build on.  
 
Brian Wivell 
George Washington University 
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